How do the advocates of anirvacanīya-khyāti refute the position of the Naiyāyikas and establish the position of Advaitins regarding the problem of error? Critically discuss.
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The following answer addresses the question "How do the advocates of anirvacanīya-khyāti refute the position of the Naiyāyikas and establish the position of Advaitins regarding the problem of error? Critically discuss.".
The problem of error has been a longstanding debate in Indian philosophy, with different schools of thought proposing various solutions. In this context, the advocates of anirvacanīya-khyāti, a position held by the Advaitins, have sought to refute the Naiyāyikas' understanding of error and establish their own perspective.
The Naiyāyikas' Position on Error
The Naiyāyikas, proponents of the Nyāya school of Indian philosophy, hold that error arises due to the apprehension of something that is not real (ātattva-pratīti). They argue that in the case of error, the object perceived is not identical to the object that is actually present. For example, in the classic case of the "rope-snake" illusion, the Naiyāyikas claim that the snake perceived is not the same as the rope that is actually present (Chatterjee, 1950).
The Naiyāyikas further explain that this erroneous perception is caused by the inherent defects (doṣa) in the sense organs or the mind, or by the intervention of external factors that distort the true nature of the object. They believe that error can be corrected through the application of valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa), such as perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and testimony (āptavacana) (Chatterjee, 1950).
The Advaitins' Critique of the Naiyāyikas' Position
The advocates of anirvacanīya-khyāti, the Advaitins, challenge the Naiyāyikas' understanding of error. They argue that the Naiyāyikas' position is unable to adequately explain the nature of error and its relationship to reality.
The Concept of Anirvacanīya-khyāti
The Advaitins propose the concept of anirvacanīya-khyāti, which means "indescribable appearance" or "inexplicable cognition." According to this view, in the case of error, the object perceived is not the same as the object that is actually present, nor is it completely different. Rather, it is a unique cognition that cannot be described as either real or unreal (Sharma, 1997).
The Advaitins argue that the erroneous perception, such as the perception of a snake in the case of the rope-snake illusion, is not a mere misapprehension of the object. Instead, it is a distinct cognition that has its own unique character, which cannot be subsumed under the categories of "real" or "unreal" (Sharma, 1997).
Critique of the Naiyāyikas' Understanding of Error
The Advaitins offer several arguments to refute the Naiyāyikas' position on error:
1. The Problem of the Indefinable Nature of Error
The Naiyāyikas' view, which equates error with the apprehension of something that is not real, fails to explain the nature of error itself. The Advaitins argue that if the object of error is completely unreal, then it should not be possible to have any cognition or experience of it (Sharma, 1997). However, the fact that we do have a cognition of the erroneous object suggests that it possesses a unique and indescribable character.
2. The Inability to Explain the Phenomenal Aspect of Error
The Naiyāyikas' position, which attributes error to the defects in the sense organs or the mind, or to the intervention of external factors, does not adequately explain the phenomenal aspect of error. The Advaitins argue that even if the sense organs or the mind are defective, or if external factors intervene, the erroneous cognition still has a distinct and vivid character (Sharma, 1997). This suggests that the erroneous cognition is not simply a misapprehension of reality, but rather a unique cognition with its own phenomenal character.
3. The Failure to Explain the Persistence of Error
The Naiyāyikas' view also struggles to explain the persistence of error even after the application of valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). According to the Advaitins, if error is merely a misapprehension of reality, it should be easily corrected through the use of pramāṇa. However, the fact that error can persist, even in the face of contrary evidence, suggests that it possesses a distinct and stubborn character that cannot be fully explained by the Naiyāyikas' position (Sharma, 1997).
The Advaitins' Explanation of Error
The Advaitins, through the concept of anirvacanīya-khyāti, offer an alternative explanation for the problem of error. They argue that the erroneous cognition is not a mere misapprehension of reality, but rather a unique cognition that has its own distinct character.
The Concept of Sat, Asat, and Anirvacanīya
The Advaitins posit that the nature of reality can be understood through the categories of sat (being), asat (non-being), and anirvacanīya (indescribable). They argue that the erroneous cognition, such as the perception of a snake in the case of the rope-snake illusion, is not entirely real (sat) or entirely unreal (asat), but rather anirvacanīya, or indescribable (Sharma, 1997).
The Relationship Between Brahman and the Erroneous Cognition
The Advaitins believe that the erroneous cognition arises due to the power (śakti) of Brahman, the ultimate reality. They argue that Brahman, in its infinite potential, manifests the erroneous cognition as a unique and indescribable phenomenon, which is neither completely real nor completely unreal (Sharma, 1997).
The Role of Avidyā (Ignorance)
The Advaitins attribute the emergence of erroneous cognition to the presence of avidyā, or ignorance, which is the fundamental cause of all illusion and misapprehension. Avidyā is a beginningless and inexplicable power that veils the true nature of Brahman and gives rise to the erroneous cognition (Sharma, 1997).
Conclusion
The advocates of anirvacanīya-khyāti have presented a compelling critique of the Naiyāyikas' position on the problem of error. By introducing the concept of anirvacanīya-khyāti, they have offered a unique perspective that better accounts for the phenomenal character of error and its persistence in the face of contrary evidence. The Advaitins' explanation, which situates the erroneous cognition within the broader framework of Brahman and avidyā, provides a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of error and its relationship to reality.
While the Naiyāyikas' view may be more intuitively appealing, the Advaitins' position of anirvacanīya-khyāti presents a more nuanced and philosophically sophisticated approach to the problem of error. The ongoing debate between these two schools of thought continues to enrich the rich tapestry of Indian philosophy.