What, according to Mīmāṃsakas, is the ontological status of abhāva (absence) and how does one know it? Explain and examine.
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The following answer addresses the question "What, according to Mīmāṃsakas, is the ontological status of abhāva (absence) and how does one know it? Explain and examine.".
The Ontological Status of Abhāva (Absence) according to Mīmāṃsakas
The Mīmāṃsā school of Indian philosophy is known for its extensive exploration of the nature of reality, language, and ritual. One of the key concepts that the Mīmāṃsakas have grappled with is the ontological status of abhāva, or absence. In this answer, we will delve into the Mīmāṃsaka perspective on the nature of abhāva and how it is known.
The Concept of Abhāva in Mīmāṃsā
The Mīmāṃsakas recognize four types of abhāva: prāgabhāva (prior absence), dhvaṃsābhāva (posterior absence), atyantābhāva (absolute absence), and anyonyābhāva (mutual absence) (Sharma, 1997). These categories of absence are considered to have a distinct ontological status and are not merely negations of existence.
Prāgabhāva (Prior Absence)
Prāgabhāva refers to the absence of an object before its production or manifestation. For example, the absence of a pot before it is created is considered a prāgabhāva. The Mīmāṃsakas argue that this absence has a real ontological status, as it is a necessary precondition for the subsequent manifestation of the pot.
Dhvaṃsābhāva (Posterior Absence)
Dhvaṃsābhāva is the absence of an object after its destruction or disappearance. When a pot is broken, the absence of that pot is considered a dhvaṃsābhāva. The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that this absence is also a real entity, as it is the result of the destruction of the previously existent pot.
Atyantābhāva (Absolute Absence)
Atyantābhāva is the absolute absence of an object, such as the absence of a rabbit's horns. This type of absence is considered to have a permanent and immutable ontological status, as it is the absence of an impossibility.
Anyonyābhāva (Mutual Absence)
Anyonyābhāva is the absence of a relationship or connection between two objects. For example, the absence of a relationship between a pot and a cloth is considered an anyonyābhāva. The Mīmāṃsakas argue that this type of absence is also a real entity, as it is the negation of a specific relationship between objects.
The Epistemology of Abhāva
The Mīmāṃsakas have also developed an epistemology to account for the cognition of abhāva. They argue that abhāva can be known through a distinct pramāṇa, or means of valid knowledge, called abhāva-pratyakṣa (perception of absence) (Taber, 1992).
Abhāva-pratyakṣa (Perception of Absence)
The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that just as we can directly perceive the presence of an object, we can also directly perceive its absence. This perception of absence is not merely a negative inference, but a positive cognition of the absence itself. The Mīmāṃsakas argue that this perception of absence is a distinct form of sensory experience, akin to the perception of presence.
Causal Factors in Abhāva-pratyakṣa
The Mīmāṃsakas identify several causal factors that contribute to the perception of absence. These include the absence of the expected sense-object, the absence of the expected perceptual activities, and the absence of the expected causal conditions (Taber, 1992). By observing these absences, the perceiver can directly cognize the absence of the object in question.
Inferential Knowledge of Abhāva
In addition to direct perception, the Mīmāṃsakas also recognize the possibility of inferring the existence of abhāva. When we observe the presence of certain factors and the absence of their expected effects, we can infer the existence of an absence. For example, if we see a table but not a vase on it, we can infer the absence of the vase.
The Ontological Status of Abhāva
The Mīmāṃsakas argue that abhāva has a distinct ontological status, as it is not merely a negation of existence but a positive entity in its own right (Taber, 1992).
Abhāva as a Positive Entity
The Mīmāṃsakas contend that abhāva is not a mere logical or linguistic construct, but a real and positive aspect of reality. They argue that just as we can directly perceive the presence of an object, we can also directly perceive its absence, and this perception of absence is a valid form of knowledge.
The Causal Efficacy of Abhāva
The Mīmāṃsakas further argue that abhāva has causal efficacy and can produce effects in the world. For example, the absence of a pot can be the cause of the cognition of that absence, and the absence of a fire can be the cause of the absence of smoke (Sharma, 1997). This causal efficacy is seen as evidence of the ontological status of abhāva.
The Ontological Debate
The Mīmāṃsaka view on the ontological status of abhāva has been the subject of much debate within Indian philosophy. Other schools, such as the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas, have challenged the Mīmāṃsaka position, arguing that absence is merely a logical or linguistic construct and does not have a distinct ontological status (Taber, 1992).
Conclusion
The Mīmāṃsaka perspective on the ontological status of abhāva (absence) is a unique and influential contribution to Indian philosophy. By recognizing different types of absence and arguing for their causal efficacy and direct perceptibility, the Mīmāṃsakas have presented a compelling case for the reality of absence as a positive aspect of the world. While this view has been challenged by other schools, the Mīmāṃsaka analysis of abhāva remains an important and thought-provoking aspect of the rich philosophical discourse in India.
References:
Sharma, C. (1997). A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.
Taber, J. (1992). What Did Kumārila Bhaṭṭa Mean by Svataḥ Prāmāṇya? Journal of the American Oriental Society, 112(2), 204-221.