Present a critical exposition of Husserl's criticism of "natural attitude". How does Husserl propose to address the problems involved in natural attitude through his phenomenological method?

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The following answer addresses the question "Present a critical exposition of Husserl's criticism of "natural attitude". How does Husserl propose to address the problems involved in natural attitude through his phenomenological method?".

Husserl's Criticism of the "Natural Attitude"

Introduction

Husserl's phenomenology is a philosophical approach that seeks to describe and analyze the structure of consciousness and the objects of experience. Central to his methodology is the critique of the "natural attitude," a term he uses to describe our everyday, pre-reflective way of experiencing the world. Husserl argues that the natural attitude is problematic because it is uncritical and fails to provide a genuine understanding of the nature of experience. This essay will present a critical exposition of Husserl's criticism of the natural attitude and explore how he proposes to address these problems through his phenomenological method.

The Natural Attitude: A Critical Examination

The Pre-reflective Nature of the Natural Attitude

The natural attitude is characterized by its pre-reflective nature. In this state, individuals do not engage in philosophical reflection but rather take the world for granted. Husserl argues that this pre-reflective nature is a significant obstacle to genuine knowledge because it prevents us from questioning the assumptions and presuppositions underlying our experiences.

Husserl contends that the natural attitude is marked by a lack of self-awareness. People in this state are not conscious of the fact that their experiences are mediated by their consciousness. They assume that the objects they perceive are independent of their perception, a view Husserl calls "naive realism." This naive realism is problematic because it fails to account for the role of consciousness in shaping our experience of the world (Husserl, 1913).

The Problem of Objectivity

Another issue with the natural attitude is its assumption of objectivity. Husserl argues that the natural attitude presumes that the objects of our experience are independent of our consciousness. This assumption leads to a misunderstanding of the relationship between the subject and the object. Husserl contends that this objectivity is an illusion because it fails to recognize the role of consciousness in constituting the objects of experience.

Husserl's critique of objectivity is rooted in his phenomenological reduction, which aims to reveal the subjective structure of experience. He argues that the objects of our experience are not independent entities but rather are constituted by our consciousness. This means that our perception of objects is always mediated by our consciousness, and the objects themselves are not independent of this mediation (Husserl, 1913).

The Problem of Inter-subjectivity

The natural attitude also fails to account for inter-subjectivity. Husserl argues that the natural attitude assumes that our experiences are the same as those of others. However, this assumption is problematic because it ignores the fact that our experiences are always subjective and unique to us. Husserl contends that the natural attitude's assumption of inter-subjectivity is a form of naive realism that fails to recognize the role of consciousness in shaping our experiences (Husserl, 1913).

Husserl's Phenomenological Method: Addressing the Problems of the Natural Attitude

The Phenomenological Reduction

Husserl's phenomenological method aims to address the problems of the natural attitude by employing the phenomenological reduction. This reduction involves a process of suspending our natural beliefs and assumptions about the world in order to focus on the pure structure of experience. Husserl argues that by suspending our natural beliefs, we can gain a more accurate understanding of the nature of experience.

The phenomenological reduction involves several steps. First, we must suspend our natural beliefs about the world, including our assumptions about the objectivity of objects and the inter-subjectivity of experience. Second, we must focus on the pure structure of experience, which involves describing the essential features of experience without reference to the content of the experience. Finally, we must describe the essential structures of experience in a neutral and objective manner (Husserl, 1913).

The Epoché

The epoché is a central aspect of the phenomenological reduction. It involves a process of bracketing or suspending our natural beliefs and assumptions about the world. Husserl argues that by suspending our natural beliefs, we can gain a more accurate understanding of the nature of experience. The epoché is not a form of skepticism but rather a methodological device that allows us to focus on the pure structure of experience (Husserl, 1913).

The Description of the Essence

Once we have suspended our natural beliefs and focused on the pure structure of experience, we can describe the essential features of experience. Husserl argues that the essential features of experience are invariant and can be described in a neutral and objective manner. By describing the essential features of experience, we can gain a more accurate understanding of the nature of experience and the relationship between the subject and the object (Husserl, 1913).

The Constitution of Objects

Husserl's phenomenological method also addresses the problem of objectivity by emphasizing the role of consciousness in constituting the objects of experience. Husserl argues that objects are not independent entities but rather are constituted by our consciousness. This means that our perception of objects is always mediated by our consciousness, and the objects themselves are not independent of this mediation (Husserl, 1913).

Husserl's theory of constitution involves a process of intentionality, in which consciousness is directed towards objects. Husserl argues that this intentionality is the basis for the constitution of objects. By focusing on the intentional structure of experience, Husserl can describe the essential features of the constitution of objects and the relationship between the subject and the object (Husserl, 1913).

The Problem of Inter-subjectivity

Husserl's phenomenological method also addresses the problem of inter-subjectivity. Husserl argues that the phenomenological reduction allows us to describe the essential features of experience in a neutral and objective manner. By describing the essential features of experience, we can gain a more accurate understanding of the nature of experience and the relationship between the subject and the object (Husserl, 1913).

Husserl's theory of inter-subjectivity involves a process of intersubjective validation. Husserl argues that the essential features of experience can be validated through intersubjective agreement. By describing the essential features of experience in a neutral and objective manner, we can gain a more accurate understanding of the nature of experience and the relationship between the subject and the object (Husserl, 1913).

Conclusion

Husserl's criticism of the natural attitude reveals the limitations of our pre-reflective way of experiencing the world. The natural attitude is problematic because it is uncritical, fails to account for the role of consciousness in shaping our experience, and assumes a naive realism about the objectivity and inter-subjectivity of experience. Husserl's phenomenological method addresses these problems by employing the phenomenological reduction, the epoché, and the description of the essence. By suspending our natural beliefs and focusing on the pure structure of experience, we can gain a more accurate understanding of the nature of experience and the relationship between the subject and the object. Husserl's phenomenological method provides a valuable framework for understanding the structure of consciousness and the objects of experience.

References

Husserl, E. (1913). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. London: George Allen & Unwin.