What according to Strawson are basic particulars? What reasons does Strawson offer to believe that "material bodies" and "persons" are basic particulars? Critically discuss.

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The following answer addresses the question "What according to Strawson are basic particulars? What reasons does Strawson offer to believe that "material bodies" and "persons" are basic particulars? Critically discuss.".

What According to Strawson are Basic Particulars?

Peter Strawson, a prominent philosopher of mind and language, introduced the concept of "basic particulars" in his influential work "Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics" (1959). According to Strawson, basic particulars are the fundamental constituents of reality that are directly perceived or experienced. These particulars are not reducible to more fundamental entities and are the building blocks of the world as we experience it.

Strawson argues that basic particulars are characterized by their directness and immediacy. They are the objects of our immediate experience and are not derived from more complex entities. For instance, when we perceive a tree, we are directly experiencing the tree itself, not some underlying physical properties or abstract entities.

Reasons Strawson Offers to Believe that "Material Bodies" and "Persons" are Basic Particulars

Strawson provides several reasons to believe that "material bodies" and "persons" are basic particulars. These reasons are rooted in his descriptive metaphysics, which seeks to describe the world as it is experienced rather than as it might be conceptually analyzed.

Material Bodies

Direct Perception: Strawson argues that material bodies are directly perceived. When we see a table, we are not perceiving some abstract entity or a set of properties but the table itself. This direct perception is a key characteristic of basic particulars.
Objectivity: Material bodies are objective in the sense that they are independent of our perception. They exist whether or not we are perceiving them. This objectivity is a crucial aspect of basic particulars, as they are not dependent on the mind for their existence.
Causal Interaction: Material bodies interact causally with each other and with persons. This causal interaction is a fundamental aspect of our experience of the world and is a key feature of basic particulars.
Reference: Material bodies are referred to in our language and thought. We use names like "table," "chair," and "car" to refer to these entities. This reference is a sign that material bodies are basic particulars, as they are the objects of our discourse.

Persons

Direct Perception: Just as with material bodies, persons are directly perceived. When we see a person, we are not perceiving some abstract entity but the person themselves. This direct perception is a key characteristic of basic particulars.
Subjectivity and Consciousness: Persons are characterized by their subjectivity and consciousness. They are the subjects of experience and thought. This subjectivity is a crucial aspect of basic particulars, as it sets them apart from other entities.
Personality: Persons have a personality, which is a complex of traits and characteristics that make them unique. This personality is a key feature of basic particulars, as it is not reducible to more fundamental entities.
Causal Interaction: Persons interact causally with each other and with material bodies. This causal interaction is a fundamental aspect of our experience of the world and is a key feature of basic particulars.

Critical Discussion

While Strawson's concept of basic particulars is influential and insightful, it is not without its critics. Several philosophers have raised concerns about the notion of basic particulars and the reasons Strawson offers for their existence.

Material Bodies

Reductionism: One criticism of Strawson's view is that material bodies can be reduced to more fundamental entities, such as particles or fields. According to this view, the table we perceive is not a basic particular but a complex of particles or fields. Strawson's response to this criticism is that the reductionist view is not supported by our experience of the world. We do not experience tables as complexes of particles or fields; we experience them as tables.
Holism: Another criticism is that material bodies are not basic particulars because they are not independent of their properties. According to this view, a table is not a basic particular but a complex of properties. Strawson's response is that this view is not supported by our experience of the world. We do not experience tables as complexes of properties; we experience them as tables.

Persons

Mind-Body Problem: One criticism of Strawson's view is that persons are not basic particulars because they are not independent of their minds. According to this view, a person is not a basic particular but a complex of mental states and physical properties. Strawson's response is that this view is not supported by our experience of the world. We do not experience persons as complexes of mental states and physical properties; we experience them as persons.
Identity: Another criticism is that persons are not basic particulars because they are not stable entities. According to this view, a person is not a basic particular but a series of mental states and experiences. Strawson's response is that this view is not supported by our experience of the world. We do not experience persons as series of mental states and experiences; we experience them as persons.

Conclusion

Strawson's concept of basic particulars is a significant contribution to metaphysics. His view that material bodies and persons are basic particulars is rooted in his descriptive metaphysics and is supported by our experience of the world. However, his view is not without its critics, who argue that material bodies and persons can be reduced to more fundamental entities or that they are not stable entities. Despite these criticisms, Strawson's view remains influential and continues to be a topic of debate in contemporary metaphysics.

References

Strawson, P. (1959). Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Methuen.
Strawson, P. (1966). "On Referring." Mind, 75(300), 428-445.
Strawson, P. (1971). "The Self and Its Place in the World." In The Self and Its Place in the World (pp. 1-20). Routledge.
Strawson, P. (1986). "The Bounds of Agency." In The Self and Its Place in the World (pp. 1-20). Routledge.